The Debates End

Note: Car accidents and hurricanes have a way of disrupting life.  Better late than never on the post.

We had the third and final presidential debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney recently.  I’ve previously dedicated partial posts to the first and second debates, as well as the vice presidential debate between Joe Biden and Paul Ryan.  This last debate, however, will receive a whole post.  There were multiple important things to take away from this debate. 

Bob Schieffer did a good job moderating.  He was much better than Candy Crowley.  Schieffer has known biases in his beliefs, but you wouldn’t know it based on his job as moderator.  My main issue wasn’t so much with the questions he was asking and the answers the candidates were giving, but what wasn’t addressed.  Often, what is not present is more instructive than what is present.  This falls on Schieffer since these were his questions.

First, there was no mention of the US’s immediate neighbors, Canada to the north and Mexico to the south.  The Keystone pipeline should have been discussed with regards to Canada.  Mexico needed to be discussed in both the context of Operation Fast and Furious as well as the bigger picture because Mexico is the failing state next door. 

Second, there was no mention of the European economic crisis.  That truly blew my mind.  Despite what the Nobel Committee would have you believe, Europe is imploding away from the news spotlight.  This is a huge global problem and had to be addressed.  We need to know Obama and Romney’s thoughts on the matter, especially since this is an economic as well as foreign policy matter.

Third, the moderator didn’t even get to China until over an hour into the debate.  The relationship between the US and China is the most important two-country relationship on Earth today and will be for decades to come.  It is thoroughly absurd to wait that long to get into China.

Fourth, there were all kinds of other matters that weren’t mentioned, such as the NDAA and Guantanomo Bay, or did not get the attention I felt they deserved, like drones (only overseas use, no mention of domestic use, of course).  The intersection between foreign policy and civil liberties was virtually ignored. 

Last is my grab-bag.  I would have liked to have seen more discussion on trade agreements and nuclear arms.  Libya wasn’t discussed enough for my liking, but they did at least spend some time on it.

So, what did we actually hear from what was asked and answered?  Romney is not really all that different from Obama on foreign policy.  We saw variations in details and such, but the general course was more or less identical.  For example, both favored the crippling sanctions imposed on Iran and both favored a change in leadership in Syria, though they differed slightly in the details.  The sparks flew a bit on Libya early, but that’s about it.  Because there was little contrast between the candidates, this was actually a rather boring debate.  I had long suspected that Romney would not have meaningful difference in foreign policy from Obama and I was proven correct.  Effectively, this means that, outside of the Libya attack (which is starting to look like a major blunder by Team Obama that I may have to do more about on my blog here), foreign policy should not be a material factor in voting. 

Ask yourself this.  Why would they ignore Canada, Mexico, and Europe while placing less emphasis on China than they should and focusing almost entirely on the Middle East?  I have my theories, but just keep it in the back of your head. 

Because of the lack of contrast, it is once again difficult to score the debate.  I would call it a draw in the bigger picture sense in that both candidates had success doing what they needed to do, but if I had to pick a winner of this debate itself, I would definitely give it to Obama because he was clearly the stronger debater. 

Romney had very low expectations, so all he really had to do was not blow it and present himself as a viable diplomat and commander-in-chief.  He succeeded at not blowing it by offering limited contrast and generally carrying himself in stable manner.  Romney did well at portraying himself as tough when necessary, but diplomatic otherwise and certainly did not portray himself as a warmonger (in a sense relative to neoconservatives, not libertarians).  Romney had a few really great moments, such as his statement about the Middle East that, “We can’t kill our way out of this mess.”  Romney also did well at trying to pivot back to the domestic economy and the belief that peace and prosperity need each other.  That said, I do feel like Romney really missed an opportunity to really pound Obama on the Libya attack.

Obama didn’t deliver the knockout punch, but he clearly outperformed Romney here.  One of the biggest benefits for Obama was being largely able to dodge questions about Libya…again.  Obama continued the aggression from the last debate, which may not have been the most prudent thing to do in a foreign policy debate.  It helped him win the debate and kept Romney on the defensive most of the show, but it made Obama actually look more hawkish than Romney, believe it or not.  The lack of contrast between Romney and Obama helps Obama because it’s an implicit admission by Romney that he agrees with much of Obama’s foreign policy.  Obama also put a strong focus on snark, sarcasm, and zingers, which was probably intended to make him look more likeable and show a funny side.  I don’t think it worked at the former, but it did work for the latter. 

Here’s the bottom line.  What we didn’t hear was arguably more revealing than what we did hear and, even though Obama clearly outperformed Romney to actually win the debate itself, the bigger picture view is that it was a draw because both candidates did what they had to do.

Links:

1^st Debate Review http://timsopinionblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/a-libertarian-argument-for-voting-for.html

2^nd Debate Review http://timsopinionblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/gay-marriage-update-before-2012.html

VP Debate Review http://timsopinionblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/a-vice-presidential-and-senate-debate.html

Eurozone Nobel Prize http://timsopinionblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/the-nobel-peace-prize-goes-tothe.html

3^rd Debate Transcript http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/10/22/transcript-presidential-debate-on-foreign-policy-at-lynn-university/

Book Review – “The American Way of War” by Eugene Jarecki

This one’s a bit longer than my normal posts, just to forewarn you. Not much longer, but a bit longer.

I just finished Eugene Jarecki’s “The American Way of War.” The focus of this book is on the evolution of American foreign policy throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century. He explores the ‘mission creep’ in American foreign policy, the rise of the military-industrial complex (MIC), the reshaping of our political structure towards an inherently more militaristic versus diplomatic posture and orientation, and the concentration of power in the executive branch that began with FDR and has expanded steadily since.

Jarecki focuses extensively on the Bush Jr. administration and the Second Iraq War. This book is somewhat of a hybrid in that he spends a lot of time tying the present day to the past. We find Jarecki often flips back and forth between the past and present. I found myself struggling a bit reading this book. One, I find Jarecki’s writing to be a little incoherent and disorganized. Two, I found myself disagreeing with several minor and major points he made. Three, I had to keep reminding myself that this book was published in 2008 and the tide has shifted decidedly in our favor since then.

Ok, back to the book. In the Introduction and Chapter 1, Jarecki started by providing an excellent overview of the evolution of American foreign policy from the Monroe Doctrine to the Truman Doctrine, as well as a brief overview of the origins of the neoconservatives. It’s one of the best quick summaries of the evolution of US foreign policy that I’ve seen. I would’ve liked to have seen it go all the way to the Bush Doctrine, but I can understand why he didn’t.

Chapter 2 discusses World War 2 and the immediate aftermath. Jarecki covered a lot of ground here. He showed that the concentration of executive power really began with FDR, that our entry into World War 2 wasn’t as ‘unprovoked’ as it may seem, how FDR helped establish and mobilize the MIC to win World War 2, and the decision process that drove Truman to drop the atomic bombs on Japan following Germany’s surrender.

Chapter 3 focused a bit on the Truman Doctrine and the Domino Theory, but predominately on 1947’s National Security Act, which established the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Air Force. Jarecki details how each of these contributed to the concentration of military power into the executive branch (and shifted the power within the executive branch away from a diplomatic orientation toward a more militant one) and how these institutions contributed to various foreign policy incidents since 1947, with a special focus on the Bush Jr. administration.

Chapter 4 focused on Dwight Eisenhower, whom Jarecki portrays very favorably. The central focus was his farewell address, the first use of the term ‘Military-Industrial Complex’. After reading this chapter, it’s hard not to view him favorably as a prophet.

Interestingly, Jarecki portrays JFK negatively, as an opportunistic politician. Nobody ever portrays JFK negatively. It must be some kind of rule and I never got the memo. I found myself hoping he would take this further and attack JFK for causing the Cuban Missile Crisis and escalating our presence in Vietnam. Even though he didn’t, it was still courageous nevertheless to even remotely attack JFK. Also, this chapter makes me think that Jarecki didn’t view the USSR as a threat, which I think is incorrect.

Chapter 5 discusses the idea of military transformation as envisioned by John Boyd, but implemented by Donald Rumsfeld. Basically, the purpose of this chapter was to detail how poorly the government planned the Second Iraq War and how, if the plan truly applied Boyd’s principles, it would’ve been more successful. History has proven this view correct because that’s basically what we did.

In Chapter 6, Jarecki explored the MIC more deeply. He mentions that Eisenhower originally planned to call it the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex (MICC), but instead opted for MIC. He also threw the executive branch in there, so it really should be the Corporate-Congressional-Military-Executive Complex (CCMEC). I prefer the one I coined myself, namely Military-Industrial-Congressional-Executive (MICE) Complex, because mine flows better. The most interesting numbers in the chapter were the numbers of employees in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the national level, namely 5,000,000 versus 30,000 versus 34,000.

Jarecki starts Chapter 7 with a thorough list of the actions taken by the Bush administration that violate the Constitution. He also goes after Congress, the judicial branch, and corporations (Halliburton). However, his last section in this chapter, discussing John Yoo and the balance between security and liberty, is by far the most enlightening and insightful content in the entire book.

In the Conclusion, Jarecki discusses two particular experiences that shaped this book. One was his interactions with John McCain’s chief of staff (McCain appeared in Jarecki’s recent film called “Why We Fight”), and the other involves a series of visits Jarecki made to West Point. Here, he makes the effort to provide some solutions to the problems he’s detailed over the past seven chapters.

I would not be surprised to see this book end up on some college-level US history course syllabi. It was a work-in-progress while I was in college. Though I found Jarecki’s style to be a bit incoherent and hard to follow at times, there were flashes of profound insight, such as the John Yoo section of Chapter 7. This is a good read for anyone who wants to learn about the evolution of American foreign policy and the MICE complex, and in particular how these previous events set the stage for the Second Iraq War.